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S

ociologists have generally approached economic change in Palestine-the area now divided into
Israel, the West Bank and Gazathrough various models: the traditional colonial theory; dependency; integration into
the capitalist system; dualism, which in this
case argues that the two sectors (the modem, capitalist Jewish sector and the traditional, non-capitalist Arab sector) developed separately, either unaffected by one
another or with positive spillover effects
from the Jewish sector into the Arab sector.
Some Israelis have also used interdependency concepts to explain interaction between the two sectors; that is, they argue
that the two sectors are mutually beneficial.
In application, each of these models alone
fails to explain Palestine's economic development, or rather lack thereof.
Because . of the many geopolitical
changes Palestine has encountered during
the last two centuries, its development has
probably incorporated some aspects of all
of these theories at various times. There~ore, although the main focus of this study
ts on the Occupied Territories (or Administered T 't ·
will b .em one.s, as the Israelis prefer), I
nefty revtew some of the main features of
economtc
· c hange tn
. Palestme,
. first
.
tn the Ottom
. d
. .
1917 . s
an ~no , whtch lasted until
' ~cond, dunng the British Mandate,

which terminated in 1948; and then in the
period from 1948 to 1967, when the territories were under Jordan's and Egypt's rule.
This backward glance will provide a context of contrast and historical perspective.
A few problems are encountered in such
a study. Due to the various political interests in the area, it is sometimes difficult to
know how researchers define the borders of
the territories, particularly those of the
West Bank (or Judea and Samaria, as they
are called by Israelis). Because Israel annexed East Jerusalem, Israeli researchers
often exclude East Jerusalem from their
figures for the territories, while Arab and
most outside researchers include it, as the
annexation is illegal under international
law. Also, some studies are ambiguous as
to whether Jewish settlement ·activities are
being included and how different the figures
would be if the settlements were not included.
Moreover, Gaza is less often the focus of
research than is the West Bank. In this
context, the territories will be treated corporately, except where the case of Gaza is
different or particularly noteworthy. In
many ways, Gaza's experience is worse in
degree than in kind, due to high population
density (second only to China, 85 percent
urban) and the fact that Gazans do not have
the benefits of citizenship and·passport (and
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hence mobility) from Egypt that West
Bankers do from Jordan.
During the mid-nineteenth century, as a
result of European industrialization, Palestine ·was increasingly brought into the capitalist system. The coastal and inland plains
were cultivated, and production was increasingly geared toward external markets.
Exports grew rapidly, and by the 1870s far
outweighed imports. 1 The revenues from
the substantial export surplus helped to
finance the Ottoman public debt before
Zionist contributions entered the picture.
From 1856 to 1882, Palestine's main exports were wheat, barley, dura, sesame,
olive oil, soap, oranges, and various other
fruits and vegetables. Although at 'first
these were marketed regionally to Egypt,
Lebanon, Syria and Greece, they were increasingly exported to France and England.
During the American Civil War, cotton was
also a primary export, but after the war's
resolution, cotton production declined to a
standstill.
According to consular reports, this remarkable economic upswing was manifested in growing prosperity. Although, as
is usually the case, the direct producers
(the farmers) did not benefit as much as the
landholders, merchants, etc., consular reports testify that hoarding and buying of
tangible investments, such as jewelry, did
occur among the peasants. 2
While this introduction to the world market enhanced export revenues and pro-

duced a vigorous economy, there was a
flipside to this coin. True to the classical
model of the international flow of commodities, Palestine also became a docile market
for consumer -goods. Rice, sugar, coffee,
cotton manufactures, timber, wine, petroleum (from the United States) and coal
were among the imported goods. Luxury
items were aimed mostly at European residents, but they also reflected a growing
consumer economy.
Domestic industries were hurt by the
influx of European goods, which, due to the
industrial revolution, could be produced
much more cheaply than the traditional
products of the Arabs. The new availability
of gas lamps snuffed out the indigenous
candle-wax producers, and gasoline cans
and well-digging destroyed the earthenware
industry. The textile industry, however,
adapted by converting to cheaper, lower·
quality items. Due to the problems of shipping pottery· (fragile) and leather (bulky),
these two local industries managed to sur·
vive . The soap industry remained un·
scathed because Arab soap was produced
from olive oil (no animal fats) and, ther~
fore, continued to be in demand in IslamiC
countries. The building industry flourished,
however, and a few new industries-tour·
ism, hotels, antiques, law, and photogra·
phy-ar~se in response to the developm~nt
of communication and transportation
Iines.3
It is helpful to note here that the Ot~o
mans instituted several land laws dunng
this period that enhanced foreign participa·
tion and laid the ·foundation for later
colonization, 4 though increased revenues
seems to have been the intention of these
laws. 5

1
Roger Owen, ed. ,Studies in the Economic and
Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois
Press, 1982), p. 20; but see Haim Gerber, "Modernization in Nineteenth-Century Palestine-The Role of
Foreign Trade," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 18, no.
30, p. 259. He says that imports outweighed exports
but that Zionist money transfers accounted for a good
portion of imports.
2
Alexander.Scholch, "The Economic Development
of Palestine, 1856-1882," Journal of Palestine Studies,
vol. 10, no. 3, p. 53.

3

Gerber, pp. 251-255.
. .
ion and
Scholch " European Penetrat
,,
'
'
1856-1882
the Economic Development of Palestme, .
in Owen, p. 56.
ws and
5 For a more thorough accounting of these 1a
·
4 Alexander

I
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Three waves of land laws (in the late

1850s, late 1860s, mid-1870s) worked · to&ether to enable individuals to dispose of
land and resulted in large landed properties.
Peasants who were deluged with tax, debt
sought wealthy investors to buy village
lands ·(sometimes whole villages) and pay
oft'these debts. In most cases, however, the
peasants were still allowed to cultivate the
land. In general, three groups of people ·
purchased the land: notables, the new bourgeoisie of Christians and Jews and European proteges, and foreign colonists (primarily the German Templars and Jews,
who exported mainly wine and cognac).
However, as Zionist (as · opposed to the
previously Jewish capitalist) land purchases increased, more cultivated land was
bought and more families were dispossessed. By 1929, 29.4 percent of the peasants had lost their land to Zionist
settlement. 6

· • · as Zionist (as opposed to

the previously Jewish

~Pitalist) land purcha.ses

IDcreased, more cultivated
land was bought and more
fiDlilies were dispossessed. By
1929, 29.4 percent of tlie ._.
PtasanZio
• ts had lost their land to
rust settlement.

facturing sectors still maintained a healthy
degree of diversity and local orientation,
which enabled the economy to weather
natural crop failures. The increase in production was due not to the intensification or
modernization of methods, but to the extension of area under· cultivation. Nevertheless, one can see that the foundation had
been laid for transforming Palestine into a
peripheral economy.
Although sociologists have interpreted
the British Mandate period as a colonial
period in Palestine, this colonialism had
some atypical characteristics-:-the primary
one being that the principal goal of the
Mandate was to establish a national home
for the Jews in Palestine. This indicated
that British interests were not supreme.
Moreover, because Palestine was not a
treasure trove of raw materials nor a ripe
opportunity for-industrial investment, Br:itish interests appear to have been more
political and strategic.
At this historical juncture, dualistic theories enter to assay the period starting with
the Mandate and extending through the
present time. Propounders of this view,
mostly Israelis, say that in Palestine
two· autonomous and rival national communities ... went about their separate col. lective institutional and social lives, turning
Palestine into a binational dualistic entity ..
.. One was the low-income, primarily rural,
and relatively backward Arab economy,
and the other was the relatively modem,
high-income, and urban Jewish economy.'

. Throughout this period, although ·exports
lllereased, both the agricultural and manu-

According to these thinkers, both sectors
were growing, but the Jewish sector grew

---

~·&~----------------------------------------------------

NabJalllte~retation and effects, .see Owen above; als<;>
eatine· Zub1, "The Development of Capitalism in PalProct • The Expropriation of' the Palestinian Direct

7Jacob Metzer and Oded Kaplan, "Jointly but Severally: Arab-Jewish Dualism and Economic Growth in
Mandatory Palestine," Journal of Economic History, .
vol. 4S, no. 2, p. 328; see also Eliezer B. Ayal, "Arab
Labor in Palestine and Beyond Within a Two Sector
Development Model," Middle East Reports, vol. 15,
nos. 3-4, pp. 53-61.

4 pPuC:," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 13, no.
~·. 109; and Raja Shehadeh, "The Land Law of
2 IIPtineS2," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 11, no.

' . -99.
'Zubi, p, 99.
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faster due to external inputs. Discounting
dispossessed Arab peasants, the dualists
say the Jewish sector grew without expense
to the .Arab sector and perhaps to its benefit.
During this period, Jewish productivity
grew nearly twice as fast as Arab productivity. Arab exports to the Jewish sector
grew from 9. 3 percent of Arab net product
in 1921 to 14percent in 1935. If we include
land sales, exports grew from 13.9 percent
to 24.5 percent. Payments for land transfers
accounted for one-third of intersectoral
transactions, and according to Metzer and
Ayal these capital gains promoted growth
in the Arab economy.s Between 1931 and
1937, 529 new Arab enterprises ~~e estimated to have started, but these were no
competition for the larger Jewish enterprises. Arab transport and trade services
were used extensively by Jews, and Arab
building materials fed expanding Jewish
construction. However, due to Zionist prohibitions, the use of Arab labor in the
Jewish economy was still relatively small,
but such use was more common in private
Jewish industries. Israeli sociologists point
to this opportunity for wage labor as one of
the spillover benefits to the Arab sector,
but as Nabla Zubi points out, much of the
unemployment had been created by Zionist
land deals in the first place. By World War
II, 40 percent of Arab labor was wage
labor.9
The Jews who immigrated during this
period were mostly skilled Europeans who
transferred large sums of capital with the
intention to invest in farms, industry and
trade. The Jewish sector obviously used
niore capital-intensive, advanced technology. This did affect, for instance, the Arab
olive-oil industry, ·which could not compete
with the large-scale industry of the Jews
8
9

1bid., pp. 339-40.
Ayal, p. 56.

and their ability to import cheaper olive oil
from other countries. Moreover, the Jewish
industrial sector had pressured the British
to make ·several changes in land and tax
laws, one of which was to lift duties on
imported olive oil and sesame seed. 1o However, after the Arab rebellions in the 1930s,
the British rescinded some of the tax and
tariff changes that had benefited the Jewish
sector and purt the Arab sector.
The Histadrut, the Zionist trade union,
also pressured the British to employ a guaranteed quota of Jews. Because the Arabs
were unorganized, Jews were able to secure from the British higher wages than the
Arabs. In addition, after 1935 real wages for
Arabs declined more rapidly than those for
Jews. 11
After the 1948 War and the creation of
the state of Israel, the part of Eastern
Palestine (what is now called the West
Bank) which had not been subsumed into
the Israeli state was annexed by Jordan,
and the Gaza Strip was annexed by Egypt.
For the West Bank, this meant it was cut off
from the markets and ports in the coastal _
and northern areas. With the influx of refugees, Jordan's East Bank almost _doubled
in population, and the government's economic policies favored East Bank development:·In 1948 the East Bank, with its capital city Amman, had been less developed
than the West Bank, but by 1967, the reverse was true. Nevertheless , some
sources say that by 1966 the West Bank had
7,300 industrial establishments, 48 percen}
of both Banks, contributed 20 percent 0
Jordan's aggregate GNP, and was generating an annual growth rate of 6-8 percent per
capita. 12 Tourism, which flourished under
10Sarah Graham-Brown "The Political EconomY of
. the Jabal Nablus, 1920-48:" in Owen, pp.' 97, 140.
11
1bid: , p. 151.
u
-12Yusif A. Sayigh, "The Palestinian Econom~ ~:
der Occupation: Dependency and PauperizatJOn,
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XV , no. 4, P· 61.
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Jordanian rule, probably accounted for
many of these industries.
Financed by Jordan and outside charitable organizations, education increased in
importance, and the brain drain began.
Since much education was obtained abroad
and jobs follqwed, the area became dependent on external transfers of dollars. Fortu·nately, Jordan was able to provide a good
deal of local employment in the public
sectors, teachers, bureaucrats and other
civil service jobs, which helped keep some
professionals at home.
However, after the 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza arid instituted a number of policies, regulations and
military orders that have greatly affected
the economy of the territories.
The most conspicuous and controversial
.of its policies has been land confiscations.B
Of the West Bank's 5.8 million ·dunums (1
dunu~ = approximately 1/4 ·acre), Israel ·
now controls at least 40 percent, or 52·
percent of cultivable land.t4 Israeli settlements occupy about 170,000 dunums and
are mostly agricultural in nature. Forty
per~ent of the Jordan Valley, which is very
fertile land, is in Israeli hands.•s In Gaza,
Israel has confiscated about 34 percent.
Land confiscation has been implemented
~Y means of a number of orders that modified the laws in existence at the time of
~~pation. Among the first orders was
~tary Order~~· 58, whic.h .vest~d in the
ands of the military administration (the
Custodi
·
of . ..~ of Absentee
Property) all lands
mdtvtduals not present on the date of
l)So

.

One me have ~ven ventured to call this land reform.
at P8Per on mass settlement in Israel was presented
COnference on land reform.
Paw · A
.
Banlc · Zl • Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West
l9SS) ~ Gaza Strip, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press,
'p. 60.
.
UEmii
·cultural e Sahliyeh, "West Bank Industrial and Agriof Pal ~velopment: The Basic Problems," Journal
estrne Studies; vol. 11, no. 2, p. 65.

!

occupation. Military Order No. 25 prohibited any land transactions from occurring
without approval of the Custodian, who
was given wide powers of ownership. Military Order No. 59 took possession of state
land (a particularly controversial category,
as "state land," by traditional definition,
was cultivated by families for many generations and includes village- or communallyheld grazing lands 16). Lands were also
closed and confiscated for security, military, and public purposes, but often these
lands are eventually given to settlers, since
Israel considers settlers to be part of its
security strategy .11

In numerous cases when Arabs
have refused to sell or give up
their land, authorities or
settlers have resorted to
destroying crops and closing
off tracts of land during the·
night.
In addition, Military Order No. 291
halted all title settlement procedures. These
procedures had started under the Mandate
and continued under Jordanian rule, but
only one-third had been settled by 1967.ts
Israeli authorities have also started inserting a clause in building permits to the effect
that while the Palestinian applicant has permission to build a house on the land, the
land does not belong to him. This latter
tactic has been applied mainly in urban
areas. 19
16

See Shehadeh.
Years of Confiscating Land," Al-Fajr,
June 14, 1987, pp. 8-9.
18Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the
Occupied Territories (New York: United Nations,
1985), p. 6.
19
Ibid.' p. 4.
17 "Twenty
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Civilians were given permission to buy
hoped for, they resorted to subsidy. For
example, the 1983-4 settlement budget
land, but after speculation occurred, this
called for $470 million, in addition to the
practice was curtailed. In numerous cases
· when Arabs have refused to sell or give up
$80-$100 .million that would go to settler
subsidies. Land was given to developers at
their land, authorities or settlers have renominal cost. Buyers received interestsorted to destroying crops and closing off
free, non-indexed loans and outright
tracts of land during the night. 20
grants. 21 Moving trucks and credit cards for
Closely related to land expropriation has
electricity, water, food seeds, and fertilizbeen the Israeli settlement policy. Immediers are supplied to newcomers.22
ately after the war, the Israeli government,
The Israelis can truthfully boast of infraheaded by Labor at that time, established
structural improvements in the Occupied
eight military outposts (which developed
Territories, but these improvements have
into settlements) in the Jordan Valley (the
been designed to facilitate Jewish settlemost fertile area of the West Bank), numerment. An elaborate grid of roads has been
ous settlements in and around Jerusalem,
built to connect the settlements to one
and one in Gaza. Settlement establishments
another and to Israel.
continued to increase so that by 1977, when
Electricity is another matter of concern.
the Likud government came to power,
The West Bank has long been serviced by
there were 5,000 settlers in 36 settlements.
the Jerusalem Electric Company, a PalesCurrently there are about 150 settlements
on the West Bank and 18 in Gaza. ·
tinian company, but the Israeli Electric 1
Company has now required the JEC to
Settlement strategy has been to surround
relinquish its servicing of the settlements.
and isolate Palestinian communities, hinBecause Israel refused to grant the JEC ,
dering organized action and rendering the
p~rmission to purchase more generating .
carving out of a Palestinian homeland
equipment,
the JEC was some $30 million
nearly impossible. Settlements are also ofin debt from having had to purchase current
ten located on hilltops, and situated in a
from the IEC.23
way to gain access to the eastern water
Israeli water policies have been another
aquifer, tne only aquifer Israel had not yet
problematic area. Water resources have
tapped by 1967.
The settlements pose an illustrative con- . bee'n pla~~d under direct responsibility of
the Israei Water Commission. There are
trast of how Israeli revenues for the territhree
main aquifers in the West Bank, lotories are distributed. The Israelis have
cated
in the north, west and east. Even
spared no cost when it comes to the settlebefore
1967 Israel was tapping the western
ments. Most settlements are fully equipped
and
n·
o
rthern
aquifers, but after 1967 Israel
and connected to . the Israeli · water and
was
also
able
to
pump from the eastern one.
electrical grid. And when settlements failed
The
total
annual
water supply on t~e
to fill up as quickly as the government had
West Bank is about 850 million cubtc
meters. About 100-120 mcm of that is con- ,
20
See Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Economic Consequences of the Occupation," in Naseer H. Aruri,
ed., Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (Belmont, MA:
Association of Arab-American University Graduates, ·
1983); p. 176; and Baruch Kimmerling, "The Reopening of the Frontiers, 1967-82," in Ernest Krausz, ed.,
Politics and Society in Israel, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books; 1985), vol. III, p. 100.

21 Merle Thorpe, Jr., .Prescription for Conftic:
(Wa~hington, D.C.: ·Foundation for Middle Eas
· Peace, 1984), p. 35.
22
Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 175.
,,
23 "JEC Board, Workers Disagree on New Plan,
Al-Fajr, Jan. 3, 1988, p. 3.
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sumed by Palestinians. Before 1967 Israel
was consuming more than 60 percent of the
West Bank's water, which accounted for
about 55 percent of Israel's total supply.
Now it takes about 80 percent of West
Bank water.24 Israel draws another 9 mcm
per year from the River Jordan, endangering the Jericho springs.
Shortly after 1967, Israel destroyed 140
water pumps in the Jordan Valley and, for
its settlements, has since drilled at least 25
new wells, all suitable for irrigation, causing springs and wells in neighboring Arab
villages to dry up. In 1977-78, the 17 wells
of Jordan Valley settlements pumped 14.1
mcm, while the 106local wells pumped 12.1
mcm.2s This has had catastrophic effects on
crop yields. According to a recent article in
AI Fajr (December 13, 1987) entitled
"Jordan Valley Spring Goes Dry," in 1987
in the village of Al-Ouja, only 2,000 of the
normal9,000 dunums of land could be cultivated. In 1985, some villagers had to pay
as much as $18,000 to supplement their
irrigation-water supply. In addition, Israel
denies permission for Palestinians to drill
wells for agricultural purposes. Instead,
meters have been affixed to wells to enforce
limitations on Arab irrigation. Settlements
have no restrictions placed on water usage.
The coastal aquifer which serves Gaza is
overly exploited by Israel and now suffers
from salination from the Mediterranean.
Unlike the West Bank, where only 4 percent of agriculture is irrigated, in Gaza, 45
percent of agriculture is irrigated, so water
restrictions and salinity have greatly hurt
~ers. 26 In 1984, Gazan · settlers consumed about 30-60 mcm annually, while the
total Palestinian populati~n in Gaza consumed about 100 mcm.
u .. W t

These land, water and settlement policies
have worked together to debilitate the Palestinian economy, which was agriculturally
based. About half of the 5.8 million dunums
which make up the West Bank are cultivable. About 70 percent of farmers own their
land; the rest are tenant farmers. Arab
farmers still rely mostly on labor intensive
crops, while Israeli farms rely on capital
intensive. Palestinian farmers have adopted
some mechanization. For example, in 1967
there were 147 tractors in use and by 1977,
there were 1,534. The use of Israeli seed
stock and fertilizers is up from 4,000 tons in
1968 to 15,100 in 1976. 27 But this is not a
generalized trend. Fertilizers don't respond
well in water-stressed conditions; the shallow, rocky ground is not conducive to
mechanized tilling; 2s and all these inputs
and technology must be purchased through
Israel, whose high inflation is reflected in
their cost.
-

[Arab] farmers must obtai~
permits to plant trees and
vegetables, and Israel has
rarely issued permits to plant
new trees or even to replace
old trees.
Since 1967, the Israelis have imposed
restrictions' on which crops Arab farmers
grow and where they market their produce.
They cannot grow crops that compete with
Israeli produce. Farmers must obtain
permits to plant trees and vegetables, and
Israel has rarely issued permits to plant
new trees or even to replace old trees. 29
27 Graham-Brown

in Aruri, pp. 186-187.
Amon and M. Raviv, From Fellah to Farmer
(Rehovot, Israel: Settlement Study Centre, 1980), p.
62.
29Ann M. Lesch, "Gaza: Forgotten Comer of Pa-

-

a .er Politics," The Middle East, February
1981, p. 54.
USabli
26u
yeh, p. 66.
Water Politics,'' p. 54.

.

281.
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Therefore, the Arabs' poultry, melon and
pumpkin exports, once strong, collapsed
after 1967. The Israelis did introduce onion
seeds into the West Bank because they
would not compete with Israeli farmers, but
then the ·onions were exported through
Israel.3o
·
Gaza was refused permission to open a
canning factory to make use of its undersized oranges, which are more prevalent
now due to the salination of the water, the
lack of irrigation, and the restrictions on
replacing old trees.3t
Under Israel's ''open bridges'' policy,
exports to Jordan are encouraged. The
main exports now are oranges, olive oil and
vegetables. Watermelons, pumpkins and
some grains used to be exported, but tliese
are now imported.32
Most of Arab agricultural produce is sold
fresh directly at local markets. And because there is only one food-processing
plant (a tomato paste factory in Hebron) on
the West Bank, timing is an important factor in Arab exports. The frequently imposed town curfews, market closings, and
roadblocks can be and have been detrimental to family income.
On the other hand, Israeli produce,
which is usually cheaper, floods the markets of the territories. In 1980-81, of a total
87,797 tons of vegetables for sale in West
Bank markets, 22,930 tons came from Israel. Of fruits, melons and pumpkins,
32,095 tons of the 62,207 total were from
Israel. In Gaza that same year, 16,036 of
43,691 tons of vegetables and 22,800 of
33,476 tons of fruit were from Israel.33
Industry in the territories is besieged by a
number of problems. Raw materials are

scarce in the West Bank, and so they must
be imported. Of .the raw materials used in
industry, 24 percent originate in the West
Bank, 61 percent come from Israel and 15
percent from abroad. 34
Arab banks were barred from reopening
after 1967, and until recently Israel had
refused permission to open new banks. The
recent exception is the Cairo-Amman
Bank, which opened. in the West Bank in
September 1986, but this bank is lending
only to merchants and requires excessive
guarantees.Js Therefore, Palestinians in the
territories must rely on Israeli banks, which
charge high interest rates in the territories.
Foreign transfers must also go through Israeli banks. Therefore, there are no loan
facilities, credit, or banking services.
Moreover, because Israeli products are
freely marketed in the ·territories, Arab in·
dustry finds it difficult to compete with
comparatively cheap Israeli goods. (Israeli
goods are subsidized sometimes up to 60
percent.) In fact, the West Bank and G~
are the second largest importers of Israeli
goods. In 1983, the territ!tries imported
$680.5 million of Israeli goods, while the
United States imported $1,329.2 million
from Israel's total exports of $?,5,1~.3
million. 36 The value of the territones ID·
dustrial imports is seven times that of its
agricultura,l imports, reflecting the dearth of
industry in the t~rritories.
.
Israel imports 73 percent of the terntories' commodities (which is six times more
than the amount of the agricultural prod·
ucts it imports from the territories), bu~
most of these commodities are reexP?rted
Israeli goods which had been unfi.rus~
goods subcontracted to the territones ~
cause of low labor costs.37 In fact, mos

lestine," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol XV, no. 1,
p. 47.
30
Arnon, p. 69, and Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 189.
31
Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 188.
32
Sahliyeh, p. 68.
33
Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 189.

34

Sahliyeh, p. 59.
ant
Years of Occupation _Breeds StagD 9 '
Dependent E~onomy," Al-Fajr; May 17, 1987, P· ·
36
Sayigh, p. 47.
37
1bid.' p. 48.
35 ''Twenty

82

COLES: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TERRITORIES

Palestinian crafts are sold to Israel, labelled
"Made in Israel," arid then sold abroad.
The lack of raw materials and financing
and the competition from Israeli goods,
combined with the uncertain political status
of the territories, make investment in industry undesirable. It is no surprise then that
industry in the territories has declined.
Even though the percentage of Arab
wage labor is increasing, West Bank industry employs only 13-15 percent of the West
Bank labor force, compared to 22.2 percent
in 1963. The industrial sector now contributes about 6. 7 percent to the territories'
GNP, compared to 8.7 percent in 1966. By
the late 1970s industrial firms numbered
around 2,587, two-thirds were in auto repair, blacksmithing, carpentry, cement and
stone. The rest were in sewing, weaving,
leather and plastic.Js Tourism has declined,
as Israeli restrictions on Arab travel agencies and their lack of access to advertising
have drawn tourists away from the territories. And ·restrictions on building in the
te~tories have meant that the local con.struction industry is not allowed to respond
to the growing demand for housing.
In contrast to the lack of investment in
the Arab industrial sector, by 1983 the
I.sraelis had built six industrial parks (totalling 1,260 dunums) in the territories and
were planning seven more (totalling 15,010
dunums), primarily to give employment to
the ~ettlers. One;..half of all the workers in
the largest industrial · park are Jews employed in _military installations.39 Although
these require heavy financing, government
money has been readily available. Entre. Preneuts inside Israel can sell their-present
business at a high profit and receive a free
plot in the industrial parks in the
territories. 40

las .
39

~Yeh, p. 58.

Because of the poor outlook in agriculture and industry, many families left farming or supplement their income by wage
labor in Israel. Immediately after the war,
labor from the territories was prohibited by
Israel, but when the Israeli economy experienced an upswing and labor officials saw
that cheap migrant labor would fill jobs that
Israelis didn't want, the restrictions were
dropped.

. . . more than half of the
territories' labor force is
engaged in the Israeli
economy.
In 1983, 37.8 percent of the territories'
labor force (32.7 percent from the West
Bank and 46.5 percent from Gaza) worked ·
in Israel (compared to 13 percent in 1970). 41
These figures do not include illegal employment, which has been estimated to be as
high as 20,000, or another 15 percent. The
majority of those employed in Israel are in
construction. Another 15,000 are in subcontracting businesses (construction, furniture, textiles and metals). 42 Together, that
means more than half of the territories'
labor force is engaged in the · Israeli
economy. 43
Conversely, employment in the territories declined from 88 percent in 1970 to 62
percent in 1983. 44 The largest loss of local
labor has been in agriculture, which declined from 44.8 percent in 1969 to 28
percent by the late 1970s, and 26 percent
41 Sayigh,

p. 49 . .
p. 61.
43 See Moshe Semyonov and Noah Lewin-Epstein,
Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water (New York:
ILR Press, 1987) for a study on the effects of migrant
labor on the Israeli labor force.
44Living Conditions .. . , p. 16.
42Sahliyeh,

·

40J~~mg Conditions . . . , pp. 22, 27.
ld., p. 26.
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the West Bank and 6.4 percent in Gaza,
accounting for 72 percent of domestic uses
in the territories (compared to 54-59 percent in Israel, Jordan, Egypt or Syria). 50
While many dualists point to this as a sign
of prosperity in the population, such a high
figure also reflects the lack of investment in
the territories.
The absence of a centralized government
has had its socio-economic effects also.
Obviously, the governmental void means a
lack .of public-sector jobs, lack of planning
and development schemes, coordination
and institutions. Some have tried to orga·
nize locally. For instance, in the mid-l970s
the National Guidance Council, a group
intended to deal with development issues,
formed, but many of its members were
arrested, exiled or debarred from public
office.st Trade unions have experienced a
similar demise. Such organizations are sub· _
ject to search, seizure and closure.
One can see that Palestine does not fit
neatly into any one of the various develop- 1
ment theories. The traditional colonial theories don't fit because Britain didn't act pri·
marily in its own interests in Palestine, as. it
did in its other colonies, such as Indta.
Instead, it played the role of facilitator for
Zionist interests. Perhaps .the concept of
"internal colonialism" comes closer be·
cause it incorporates the additional aspects
of dispossession and displacement of the
population and is carried out by a power
now within the area; perhaps the closest
parallel in this instance would be South
Africa. Dependency theory seems not ~n
tirely appropriate. because the territones
lack the sovereignty ~nd geograp~cal se~r
ration of center and periphery that IS usu Y
. depend ency s1tua
. t'Ions. .And for·.
present m
eign investment a major element ID d~pen
dency theory, i; missing in the territones.

for 1983.4.5 The proportion of the labor force
in industry has remained level, reflecting
the lack _of in<;tustrial development.
Few, if any, Palestinian laborers are engaged in strategic branches of any ~ector or
in ·a highly skilled capacity (except construction}. They commute into Israel daily
(laws prohibit staying overnight, though
some do so surreptitiously). And for some,
especially Gazans, commuting itself may
take up to 20 hours a week. 46
Official Arab laborers have the same
taxes withheld as the Israeli laborer, but
they do not receive the same benefits.
When they are entitled to benefits, they
receive them in the territories, where facil~~
ities, such as hospitals, are of lower
quality. 47 This certainly must contribute to
the high numbers of illegal workers, who
would rather not have money withheld
from which they reap no benefit.
Hospitals, research centers, cooperatives, etc. which could absorb labor are few
and undersupported. Those social, health
and educational institutions that exist do so
primarily from transfers of external philanthropic organizations. But even these come
under Israeli restrictions. For instance,
ANERA [American Near East Refugee
Aid], which receives dollars from
U.S.A.I.D. and is one of the least restricted
non-governmental organizations in Israel,
had projects for a hospital, electrification,
and agricultural co-ops disapproved in
1979'.48 .
By 1974, earnings from Israel accounted
for one-fourth of the territories' GNP. 49
Remittances account for about one-third.
Before .1973, per-capita consumption grew
at an annual average rate of 6. 7 percent on
4
'Ibid., p. 18.
46CJarfield H. Hom, "Gaza's Labour Trap," IDRC
Reports, October 1986, p. 5.
47
Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 209.
48
lbid.~ p. 221.
49
Gabriel, p. 255.

. .solbid.
1
' Graham-Brown in Aruri, p. 216.
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Although the territories began their integration into the capitalist system early in
the nineteenth century (a booming economy period that stage-theorist Rostow
might consider a "take-off''), a total restructuring of the territories' agricultural
system is still incomplete; though the econ. omy is much more export-oriented, it is still
somewhat traditional and diverse. Thirty
percent is sharecropping, and land holdings
are generally small. In fact, the territories
are largely cut off by Israel from direct
integration with the world system. The territories have been used to facilitate the
capitalist world system, while not becoming fully a part of it.
The dualistic and interdependency models depicted by Israeli sociologists seem

euphemistic at best. During both the Mandate period and the occupation period,
there was extensive interaction between
the two sectors and the "spillover" effects
obviously have not been to the benefit of
the traditional sector.
In short, it's theoretically safe to say that
the territories have been systematically underdeveloped by an outside power (Zionism) which itself eventually became a
pivotal part of the area (Israel). Israel's
policies in the territories obviously are intended to work for the benefit of the Jewish
state. Whether the economic conditions of
the territories can be reversed and rehabilitated, and under what geopolitical arrangement, is the conspicuous question still begging an answer.
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